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ORGANIZATIONS, MOVEMENTS, AND NETWORKS
CHARLES HECKSCHER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The decline of labor over the last few decades has spawned
competing diagnoses and proposals for change.  One set has fo-
cused on the way unions are organized — whether they have
enough size, strategic focus, internal coordination and communica-
tion, and whether their finances and other resources are properly
allocated.1  A second set has focused on mobilizing movements
around issues of social and economic justice.2  So far, neither ap-
proach — strengthening union organizations or generating work-
ing-class mobilization — has had much success.
This article argues that the debate between the two perspec-
tives misses a fundamental point: that social and economic develop-
ments have transformed the nature of both organizations and
movements.  Employer organizations are moving from bureaucratic
structures to more decentralized, process-based forms, with differ-
ent points of strength and weakness than the familiar bureaucratic
behemoths that unions faced a half-century ago.  At the same time,
social movements have evolved from mass-based to identity-based
forms that are also more fluid and decentralized.  Labor cannot
succeed without understanding both of these transformations, and
its response must involve a move away from traditional ways of or-
ganizing towards more network-based forms, including systematic
alliances with related groups and the use of “swarming” pressure in
the place of mass strikes.
* Professor of Labor Studies and Employment Relations and Director of the
Center for Workplace Transformation, Rutgers University.
1. See, e.g., Charles Craver, The Current and Future Status of Labor Organizations, 36
LAB. L.J. 210 (1985); PIERRE-ERIC TIXIER, AN IMPOSSIBLE FRENCH SOCIAL COMPROMISE?
THE FIRM AS THE BASIS OF SOCIAL REGULATION (GIP-Mutations Industrielles, Working
Paper No. 5.47, 1996).
2. See, e.g., REKINDLING THE MOVEMENT: LABOR’S QUEST FOR RELEVANCE IN THE
21ST CENTURY (Lowell Turner et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter REKINDLING THE MOVE-
MENT]; DAN CLAWSON, THE NEXT UPSURGE: LABOR AND THE NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
(2003).
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Part II of this article explores the way in which the current di-
vide in the labor movement reflects and fails to overcome the limi-
tations of traditional categories of thought.  Parts III and IV
examine the evolution of employer organizations and social move-
ments over the past fifty years.  Part V briefly reports on research
that shows the current fragmentation and inability of worker orga-
nizations to respond to these developments.  Finally, Part VI sug-
gests ways in which recent research on networks could help in
rethinking the problem of labor mobilization.
II. THE CURRENT DIVIDE: ORGANIZATION V. MOVEMENT
The history of labor in the twentieth century was marked by a
tension between two views: one that saw it as a set of powerful orga-
nizations, and another that saw it primarily as a movement of work-
ers trying to express their interests and beliefs in a hostile economic
system.  Those who focused on the movement side tended to see
organizations as constraints on spontaneity and energy; they often
expressed scorn for “business unionism,” perceiving it as an ob-
struction to the true expression of worker solidarity.  Those who
focused on organizations, conversely, often saw the “movement”
types as fuzzy idealists who did not understand the hard reality of
building capacity for conflict and sustaining the gains won in
bargaining.3
This divide has continued to shape the labor debate to the pre-
sent day.  Indeed, the divide was sharpened in the period before
the 2005 AFL-CIO elections by the campaign of the New Unity Part-
3. For an example of a “movement” view among labor historians, see Judith Ste-
pan-Norris & Maurice Zeitlin, Union Democracy, Radical Leadership, and the Hegemony Of
Capital, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 829 (1995).  The “organization” view was most clearly ex-
pressed by John L. Lewis in his attacks on those who wanted more internal democracy
and “autonomy.”  See Convention Reaffirms Structure of UMWA After Autonomy Debate,
UNITED MINE WORKERS J., Nov. 1, 1960, at 12-15.  More recent examples include Jelle
Visser & Jeremy Waddington, Industrialization and Politics: A Century of Union Structural
Development in Three Countries, 2 EUR. J. OF INDUS. REL. 1 (1996); Gary Chaison, Union
Mergers and Union Revival: Are We Asking Too Much or Too Little?, in REKINDLING THE
MOVEMENT, supra note 2, at 238-56; Bernhard Ebbinghaus, Ever Larger Unions: Organisa-
tional Restructuring and Its Impact on Union Confederations, 34 INDUS. REL. J. 446, 446-48
(2003) (discussing the merging of many small unions into fewer, larger unions, and the
increase in ‘super-unions’ that include members from many sectors, economic levels,
and occupational groups).
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nership (NUP) and the Change to Win Coalition, led by Service
Employees International Union (SEIU) President Andy Stern, to re-
organize the labor movement into a smaller number of larger,
more coherent and more centralized unions.4  Stern’s diagnosis of
the ills of labor is that unions have become too fragmented and too
diffuse — spreading from their original industry bases to organize
anyone, anywhere — thereby losing the unity of purpose and con-
centration of membership that were the bases of power in better
days.5  From this perspective, the issue is one of politics and organi-
zation: the need is to attack entrenched fiefdoms in order to build
more coordinated action on a large scale.
The “movement side” has criticized this centralizing proposal
as a “power grab” by leaders who have lost touch with their mem-
bers, who are drawn to a conservative, corporate model, and who
believe in the power of organization, but forget that it depends on
the underlying power of mobilized workers.6  As one observer put
it:
Historically, organizing on the scale labor needs . . . has
always been a product of a broad social movement.  It de-
pended, not just on militant tactics and big staffs, but on
the democratic participation and empowerment of
4. The Service Employees International Union (SEIU) is one of the largest
American unions, with nearly two million members, and one of the only major unions
to have grown substantially in the past decade.  For more information, see SEIU, http:/
/www.seiu.org (last visited Nov. 31, 2005).  NUP was formed in 2003, dissolved in early
2005, and in effect replaced by the Change to Win Coalition in June 2005.  The central
players were the SEIU, the Teamsters, the United Food and Commercial Workers
(UFCW), and UNITE-HERE (the merged clothing-and-hotel workers’ union), with the
Laborers’ Union and the Carpenters also joining in at times.  In May 2005, Stern and
four allies released a formal proposal for reform entitled Restore the American Dream:
Building a 21st Century Labor Movement that Can Win. See Change To Win, Restore the
American Dream: Building a 21st Century Labor Movement that Can Win, http://www.
changetowin.org/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2006) [hereinafter Restore the American Dream].
5. See generally Restore the American Dream, supra note 4.
6. See, e.g., Steve Early, Reutherism Redux: What Happens When Poor Workers’ Unions
Wear The Color Purple, AGAINST THE CURRENT, Sept./Oct. 2004, available at http://www.
kclabor.org/reutherism_redux.htm; Joann Wypijewski, The New Unity Partnership: A
Manifest Destiny for Labor, COUNTERPUNCH NEWSLETTER (CounterPunch, Petrolia, Calif.),
Oct. 6, 2003, available at http://www.counterpunch.org/jw10062003.html.
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thousands of ordinary people, responding as much to the
social vision labor represented as the need for a contract.7
What can theory tell us about these issues?  First, we should
recognize that both sides have a point and neither can be ignored.
The fundamental terms we use in talking about unions reflect the
dual nature of the problem: we speak almost interchangeably of
“the labor movement” and of “organized labor,” but these terms are
not interchangeable.  Historically, the success of labor depended
on a delicate balance and synergy between organization and move-
ment.  Furthermore, this balance differs in different situations.
The most familiar pattern today is still that of industrial union-
ism, as modeled most clearly by the United Auto Workers and the
Steelworkers starting in the 1930s.  On the organizational side, they
are generally larger and more centralized than their craft brethren,
and more diverse in occupational type.  These qualities are in large
part a result of the nature of the employers they face, which are
large, bureaucratic companies with vast resources covering diverse
work forces and geographies.8  As for their movement foundation,
it is generally characterized as “mass”- or “class”-based: that is, tran-
scending traditional ethnic or occupational communities,9 and able
to draw together a large spectrum of otherwise separate groups
through an appeal to shared conflicts with employers.  These un-
ions frequently pursue strategic goals that involve social justice as
well as member benefit, and their centralized structure helps to sus-
tain these campaigns that are not directly tied to local needs.10
The relation of organization to movement in industrial union-
ism has always been one of dynamic tension at best.  For negotiat-
7. David Bacon, Immigrant Workers Fight to Run Local 399 (Sept. 16, 2005),
http://dbacon.igc.org/Imgrants/01Loc399.html.  This is not just a radical or academic
view: some union leaders, notably Larry Cohen of the CWA, share the view that the key
problem is to mobilize rather than concentrate.
8. See CHARLES C. HECKSCHER, THE NEW UNIONISM: EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN
THE CHANGING CORPORATION 15-52 (1988).
9. Traditional communities were, of course, important in industrial unions —
the energy of the Irish or the Italians drove many strikes; unions with heavy female
representation often drew on feminist solidarity; certain railroad brotherhoods drew on
minority racial unity — but industrial unions depended on being able to transcend
these divisions when necessary.
10. See generally DAVID BRODY, WORKERS IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA: ESSAYS ON THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY STRUGGLE (Oxford Univ. Press 1993) (1980).
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ing leverage, leaders rely on the ability to manage their members’
willingness to make major sacrifices in the name of a cause — to
give up pay for long periods, to face employer intimidation and
social criticism — but they have to be able to focus that sacrifice in
a disciplined, unified way around particular contract demands and
at crucial negotiating moments.  In dealing with large, bureaucratic
employers, militance that “gets out of hand” can be as damaging as
a lack of militance.  There is certainly a tendency, as unions become
more established and accepted, for the organizational side to try to
rein in the unpredictable energy of mass action.  The usual com-
promise is one in which a sharp distinction is made between peri-
ods of negotiation, in which movement activism is encouraged and
mass action is the fundamental threat, and periods between negotia-
tions, in which spontaneous militant action is sharply discouraged
in favor of formalized conflict resolution.11
This is not the only possible relation of organization and move-
ment.  Craft organizations are generally smaller and less rationally
organized and face different kinds of employers.  They have a
rather different movement base, founded in traditional communi-
ties that are much “thicker” than class consciousness — with ongo-
ing institutions of education and solidarity, often with strong
connections to the daily social lives of the members.  They are
sometimes able to sustain more continuous self-management, in-
cluding supervisors within the union, rather than relying on an an-
tagonistic rhetoric towards management to unite members.  Craft
organizations are usually less formal and bureaucratic, with less ac-
countability to central levels of organization, than those of indus-
trial unions.  Since craft organizations are less dependent on
mobilization of members on a large scale, they are also less reliant
on the coordinating power of a central staff.12
This just scratches the surface of the problem, but it leads to
some general observations.  First, labor needs both organization
and movements.  It needs organization that can focus disciplined
action in a way that furthers a sustained strategy in dealing with
11. HECKSCHER, supra note 8, at 34-52. R
12. See generally DOROTHY SUE COBBLE, DISHING IT OUT: WAITRESSES AND THEIR
UNIONS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991); DAVID MONTGOMERY, WORKERS’ CONTROL
IN AMERICA: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF WORK, TECHNOLOGY, AND LABOR STRUGGLES
(1979); JOHN T. DUNLOP, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SYSTEMS (1958); BRODY, supra note 10.
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employers and it needs to mobilize voluntary sacrifice from people
who cannot be “managed” or commanded.  Second, the nature of
the employer greatly affects the organizational capacity needed by
the union:  unions need the ability to put pressure on the weak
points of employer systems.  Third, the kind of movement base also
affects organization.  Movement founded in traditional community
supports more decentralized unions with a broader range of local
activity.  In contrast, mass movements that transcend traditional
communities are more centralized, and have narrower workplace
issues on the one hand, and broader social visions on the other.
These brief reflections lead to some questions in thinking theo-
retically about the current situation.  Have employer organizations
changed in any important ways?  Have movements changed?  What
is the dynamic between current movements and current union
organizations?
To approach these issues this article will bring in two different
theories: the theory of organizations and the theory of movements.
This article’s conclusions, in brief, are: yes, both employer organiza-
tions and social movements have undergone deep changes in the
last forty years.  As a result, it is clear that organized labor has an
organization problem, and it is also clear that the labor movement
has a movement problem.  Unfortunately, when the pictures are
put together, they do not produce a new vision of promise and
hope.  There is no clear way, from within those perspectives, to
once again balance the energy of mobilization with the coordinat-
ing force of organization.
But there is another theoretical approach worth examining:
the theory of networks. The premise of network theory is that under
some conditions, loosely-structured systems of diverse groups, with-
out formal hierarchical discipline, can be powerful and can chal-
lenge formal hierarchies and sustain large-scale strategies.  This
theory suggests a possible alternative vision to that of the NUP:
rather than building up the formal organizational strength of labor,
focusing on building its network capabilities.
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III. ORGANIZATIONS: THE BREAKDOWN OF
PATERNALIST BUREAUCRACIES
Several challenges stand out in the evolution of employer orga-
nizations.  Many analysts start with their anti-union stance, but that
is not really new or unusual; most employers, especially in the
United States, have always been anti-union, and the current period
is no different.13  Among the new challenges, I would underline the
decline of the paternalist “deal” and the concomitant rise in contin-
gent work, the growing scope of international business, and the in-
creased ability to manage large and flexible organizations.
All of these challenges are driven by a set of technological and
economic forces that have profoundly destabilized a large range of
industries: the microprocessor is the largest technological change
since the development of electric power; the general increase of
affluence since the 1950s has made consumers more sophisticated
and caused them to seek more tailored solutions than before; and
international finance has become vastly broader in scope and more
rapid in execution.14  These and other developments have broken
apart relatively stable patterns of oligopolistic manufacturing mar-
kets that were the basis of industrial unionism, and they have put
new pressures on businesses.  It has become essentially impossible
for any business to make a credible promise of the kind of security
that characterized the old paternalist deal.15
13. It is true that for the period between the mid-1950s and the Reagan adminis-
tration, U.S. employers were less overtly anti-union than before or since that period,
though there is no reason to believe that their basic orientations changed.  In the long
sweep of labor history since the nineteenth century, that was, in any case, only a minor
blip. See MICHAEL GOLDFIELD, THE DECLINE OF ORGANIZED LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES
(1987); RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? (1984).
14.  See Nathaniel W. Foote et al., Making Solutions the Answer, 3 THE MCKINSEY
QUARTERLY 85 (2001); ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION (2005), available
at http://web.mit.edu/evhippel/www/democ.htm; Michael C. Jensen, The Modern In-
dustrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831 (1993);
JEREMY GREENWOOD, THE THIRD INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION (1996).
15. This is a controversial point in the literature.  Most management-oriented writ-
ing now accepts this point and preaches a notion of mobile careers. See Douglas T. Hall
& Jonathan E. Moss, The New Protean Career Contract: Helping Organizations and Employees
Adapt, 26 ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS 22  (1998); PETER CAPPELLI, THE NEW DEAL AT
WORK (1999).  A radical or union-based strand argues on the contrary that companies
have been wrong to attack job security. See DAVID M. GORDON, FAT AND MEAN: THE
CORPORATE SQUEEZE OF WORKING AMERICA AND THE MYTH OF MANAGERIAL DOWNSIZING
(1996). My comment here is based on a simple observation that nearly all companies
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The decline of paternalism has the most obvious implications
for labor.  For almost the entire history of mass-production busi-
ness, employers have seen value in having a stable, skilled, reliable
work force.  In 1914, Henry Ford thought it was worth paying nearly
double the previous wage level in order to lower turnover and in-
crease productivity, and he turned out, from a business perspective,
to be right.16  Thus, the door that unions were pushing against in
their attempt to increase security and increase pay was not tightly
shut.  Employers undeniably hated the interference of “outside”
parties, but they did not hate the idea of employment security.
Through the 1970s it was a general article of faith among large em-
ployers that it was important in business terms to try to guarantee
loyalty among the work force, especially through benefits that re-
warded long tenure.17
In the 1980s that assumption unraveled.  Businesses began to
believe that it was more effective (again, in business terms) to pay
for current performance rather than to guarantee long-term loy-
alty.  In order to maximize flexibility, companies have increasingly
felt the need to allocate resources more quickly and make fewer
long-term commitments; loyalty is less beneficial as a factor in pro-
duction.  So when unions press for security or long-term benefits,
they no longer find, as they once did, a half-sympathetic ear among
those with a purely business focus.18
The second major change, the internationalization of business,
is not so much a matter of increased trade, but, more importantly
for unions, an extension of corporations’ range of action, regard-
less of their trading patterns.  For example, General Motors Corp.
has acquired Saab and partnered with Fiat and other companies;
that have historically held to values of employment security — such as IBM, or Johnson
& Johnson, or many others — have been forced in the last twenty years to abandon this
tradition and to begin layoffs.  There remain few niches sufficiently protected from
global competition to allow survival with traditional levels of employment security.
16. See STEPHEN MEYER III, THE FIVE DOLLAR DAY: LABOR, MANAGEMENT, AND SO-
CIAL CONTROL IN THE FORD MOTOR COMPANY (1981).
17.  See generally CHARLES HECKSCHER, WHITE-COLLAR BLUES: MANAGEMENT LOYAL-
TIES IN AN AGE OF CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING (1995) (observing this shift in managerial
attitudes based on over twenty-five years of interviews with managers in a large range of
companies).
18. For an elaboration of this account of corporate loyalty and paternalism, and its
breakdown, see id.
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Nike has become a nearly “virtual company,” sourcing its products
wherever is cheapest at the moment; and “global supply chains” are
becoming widespread.19  The main problem internationalization
poses for labor is that companies now extend far beyond any ex-
isting sense of community or solidarity — across national bounda-
ries and even across major trading blocks like Asia and Europe.
And without community and solidarity there can be no movement
base for labor.
Finally, there has been a tremendous amount of organizational
innovation.  Some of it is technical, such as software that permits
monitoring of performance at all levels to an unprecedented de-
gree.  Other aspects of it are social, such as the extensive decentrali-
zation of operations within tightly developed strategic frameworks
and also the ability to pull people together for projects across geog-
raphies, divisions, levels, and skill sets.20  Businesses for the most
part function much better today than they did a few decades ago.
They can both enforce cost/quality discipline and encourage
greater innovation and responsiveness.  They can coordinate spe-
cialized knowledge and diverse cultures into coherent strategic plat-
forms.  And although they are often larger, they are less
bureaucratic in the sense of relying on fixed rules and
procedures.21
The issue for unions is whether they can hope to match these
organizational transformations and to act, once again, as a direct
counterweight to companies, as did industrial unions.  That seems
highly unlikely from the point of view of organization theory.  A
diagnosis that simply says, “Companies are bigger and more central-
ized than unions, so we need to match their size and coherence,”
19. See Morris A. Cohen & Suman Mallik, Global Supply Chains: Research and Applica-
tions, 6 PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MGMT. 193 (1997); Arnaldo Camuffo & Giuseppe
Volpato, Partnering in the Global Auto Industry: The Fiat-GM Strategic Alliance, 2 INT’L. J.
AUTOMOTIVE TECH. & MGMT. 335 (2002); John Seely Brown et al., Loosening Up: How
Process Networks Unlock the Power of Specialization, MCKINSEY Q. (SPECIAL EDITION: RISK AND
RESILIENCE) (2002).
20. See Paul S. Adler, Market, Hierarchy, and Trust: The Knowledge Economy and the
Future of Capitalism, 12 ORG. SCI. 215 (2001); Brown, supra note 19; Joel Podolny &
Karen Page, Network Forms of Organization, 24 ANN. REV. OF SOC. 57 (1998) (advocating
broader focus of economic views of organization to include constraint and dysfunction-
ality of constituent parts).
21. See Adler, supra note 20.
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ignores most of what is going on.  Companies have much more mo-
tivation to fight against the kinds of benefits that unions usually
seek; they have a scope of operations that makes it relatively easy for
them to shift production beyond any plausible range of formal
union organization; and, presenting the greatest difficulty for un-
ions, they have a level of operational flexibility that enables them in
many industries to keep operating for substantial periods in the
face of strikes.  Mass walkouts do not usually cause the pain they
once did.22
If there is a positive organizational lesson for labor, it is quite
different from the familiar industrial logic of matching mass with
mass.  The direction in which companies are moving is from that
stable hierarchical model towards one of tight interdependence,
depending on the integration of wide varieties of skills around shift-
ing missions.  The new organization is less vulnerable to mass walk-
outs — but it is often more vulnerable to small, targeted disruptions.
In particular, the key weak points are no longer within compa-
nies but between them.  As part of the move towards flexibility, com-
panies have increasingly focused on “core competencies” and have
built connections to other companies through outsourcing or alli-
ances to fill out the “value chain.”23  This approach, known in man-
ufacturing as “just-in-time inventory,” means that a small,
22. The decline of strikes has been well-documented. Bureau of Labor Statistics
data indicate that time lost due to strikes, which hit as high as 38% of total working time
in the 1950s, dropped to around 10% in the 1970s, 5% in the 1980s, and generally
below 2% since then.  News Release, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Work Stoppages
Summary (Table 1) (2005), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/wkstp.t01.
htm.  Similar drops have occurred in most OECD countries. See THE ROLE OF UNIONS
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Tito Boeri et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter THE ROLE OF
UNIONS]. See also Jeffrey Ball et al., Don’t Walk: Why Labor Unions Have Grown Reluctant to
Use the ‘S’ Word — The Global, High-Tech Economy Makes Striking Riskier as Membership De-
clines — A Sense of Shared Purpose, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 1999, at A1.  For evidence that
employers have increased their willingness and ability to operate during strikes, see
Peter  Cramton et al., The Use of Replacement Workers in Union Contract Negotiations: The
U.S. Experience, 1980-1989, 17 J. OF LAB. ECON. 667 (1998).
23. See RICHARD NORMANN & RAFAEL RAMIREZ, DESIGNING INTERACTIVE STRATEGY:
FROM VALUE CHAIN TO VALUE CONSTELLATION (1994); Remo L. Häcki & Julian Lighton,
The Future of the Networked Company, 3 MCKINSEY Q. 26 (2001).
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unexpected delay in one key location along the chain can cause
more damage than a large, predictable strike.24
Unions focused on single companies or industries are not well
positioned to take advantage of those “Achilles’ heels” in modern
production.  Organizations that would be good at it are not necessa-
rily large, concentrated hierarchies.  They would generally be
smaller and more spread out, not necessarily built around industry
lines at all, but perhaps around technologies or supply chains.  But
such unions would create new problems of coordination: how
would they achieve coordinated disruptive action among workers in
different sectors for goals that are not directly related to the work-
ers’ own working conditions?  Almost surely the image of a large,
industry-focused bureaucracy would not work for this purpose; we
need to explore the equivalent of “flexibility” on the labor side.
IV. THE RISE OF “NEW MOVEMENTS”
Movements are much harder to study than organizations: they
rise and fade, change shape and drift like mist, and polls are gener-
ally unable to capture them.  Many theorists have grappled with a
sense that something fundamental has happened to movements in
the last forty years, but they have not reached wide agreement on
what that something is.
One point that does seem well-founded, however, is that class-
based or mass-based movements have declined in that time period
throughout the industrialized world.  The rate of strikes is one indi-
cator that reflects this decline in nearly every country.25  More gen-
erally, there have been few sustained large-scale actions around
work issues.  In the United States, there have been a number of
occasions in recent years in which those schooled in the history of
industrial unionism felt, “This is it, this will uncork the bottled-up
dynamic of protest.” Think of the Pittston strike of 1989, in which
AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland was dragged off to jail for civil
24. This conclusion has been noted by a number of union leaders, but has not, to
my knowledge, been documented in academic literature.  It follows, however, from the
large raft of studies of value chains. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 23.
25. In the United States, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics figures, work
stoppages varied wildly throughout the 1950s; dropped to 10% or so in the early 60s;
rose to 20% in the late 60s; down to 10% in the 70s; to 5% in 1980s; to 1-2% after 1990,
except for a brief spike (6%) in 2000. See Work Stoppages Summary, supra note 22.
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disobedience; the UPS strike of 1997, with its wide appeal around
issues of contingent work; or the outpouring of white-collar protest
starting around 2004 against the outsourcing of technical jobs.
And, of course, many in the AFL-CIO believed that the aggressive
public organizing drives unleashed by John Sweeney and Richard
Bensinger26 in the late 1990s would tap a wellspring of protest that
had been hidden by the previous passivity of the labor movement.27
Yet none of those events has connected to a movement that could
energize labor resurgence.
Europe is still capable of generating mass movements at times,
but they seem to have declined in power as well.  The advance of
neoliberalism has been strong throughout the European Commu-
nity and has generated protests that echo those of the past — but
they have remained little more than echoes, fading rather than
gaining in strength; and they have not managed to stem the tide.28
France has seen a series of mass risings, in 1995, 2003, and 2005,
against various attempts to undermine the social-democratic model.
Yet these actions, even in a country where protests have many times
transformed political life, have not altered a gradual rightward po-
litical drift.  In Germany, IG Metall’s 2003 effort to call on militant
adversarial sentiment in a campaign for shorter hours ended in
clear defeat which was widely seen, even within the union, as a re-
jection of such tactics.29
Despite these apparent reverses, a loosely connected set of the-
orists argues that movements have not declined, they have just
changed shape.  In this view, “New Social Movements” have devel-
oped since the 1960s, and are characteristically more decentralized,
26. John Sweeney was elected President of the AFL-CIO, the central labor federa-
tion, in 1985; Richard Bensinger was his controversial Director of Organizing who agi-
tated forcefully for increased attention to organizing.
27. See Richard Rothstein, Toward a More Perfect Union: New Labor’s Hard Road, 26
AM. PROSPECT, May-June 1996, at 47.
28. See THE ROLE OF UNIONS, supra note 22; PIERRE-ERIC TIXIER, MUTATION OU
DÉCLIN DU SYNDICALISME? LE CAS DE LA CFDT (1992).
29. See, e.g., David McHugh, German Workers Abandon Strike in Union Defeat, N.Y.
SUN, July 1, 2003, at (Foreign) 5 (citing polls indicating that 75% of Germans and even
68% of union members opposed the strike).
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more participatory, more associational, and more focused on issues
of identity and self-development than old movements.30
Certainly this notion connects to experiences in the labor
arena.  Probably the most important piece of legislation affecting
the workplace in the past two decades (at least on the progressive
side) is the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA),31 which created
a broad new set of employment rights.  This act was passed over
fierce employer resistance with virtually no involvement from or-
ganized labor; the energy came from a diverse, decentralized,
loosely coordinated set of groups ranging from large, established
service organizations to radical direct-action associations.32  The
motivations included a strong element of conscious identity-defini-
tion, one of the hallmarks of new social movements — the recasting
of disability from something shameful to something that could be
revealed proudly in the public sphere.33  More recently, gay and
lesbian groups have had a substantial impact in a similar way;
though they have not succeeded in getting national legislation
passed, they have persuaded many large companies to treat same-
sex relations on a par with traditional marriage.34
In the late 1980s, when I first wrote about the future of labor, I
put my bets primarily on these new movements: it appeared that
groups oriented to pride in black identity, women, Hispanics, and
so on had far more momentum than movements based on class
identity, and they continued to make gains in rights during the oth-
erwise bleak Reagan era.35
But since that time we have learned a bit more about new
movements, and the picture has grown more complicated.  One
30. For an American view, see Mayer N. Zald, The Trajectory of Social Movements in
America, in 10 RESEARCH IN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, CONFLICTS AND CHANGE 19 (Louis Kries-
berg & Bronislaw Mistzal eds., 1988).  For a European view, see Claus Offe, New Social
Movements: Challenging the Boundaries of Institutional Politics, 52 SOC. RES.  817 (1985). See
generally Hank Johnston et al., Identities, Grievances, and New Social Movements, in NEW
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: FROM IDEOLOGY TO IDENTITY (Hank Johnston et al. eds., 1985).
31. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213
(2000).
32. See Charles Heckscher & David Palmer, Associational Movements and Employment
Rights: An Emerging Paradigm?, 12 RES. SOC. ORG. 279 (1993).
33. See id.
34. See Jay Greene & Mike France, Culture Wars Hit Corporate America, BUS. WK.,
May 23, 2005, at 90.
35. See HECKSCHER, supra note 8.
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very important problem is that they are not essentially focused on
the world of work.  The enormous impact of multiple civil rights
movements on work has been, in essence, a byproduct of larger so-
cial claims: the workplace is just one venue for asserting universal
rights.  Thus, the new movements have not focused clearly on defin-
ing the kind of workplace that would meet their ideal of justice, and
they only sporadically worked to build local institutions that could
define and enforce rights in an ongoing way on the job.36
Even more important, however, is the fact that identity move-
ments have generally failed to sustain strong organizations and they
have a significant tendency to fracture.  Though this is partly due to
their relative immaturity — forty years is a short time in social his-
tory — there seems to also be a deeper cause: the communities on
which they are based are systematically unstable. Traditional com-
munities, which are central to craft unionism and still play a role in
industrial movements, are based on long-lasting “thick” webs of re-
lations. Class communities are thinner, but are nevertheless ori-
ented to a stable reference point in the enduring opposition of
interests between employers and employees.  The new identity move-
ments, by contrast, are based around the deliberate “bringing to
consciousness” of a sense of community that had been hidden and
a development of solidarity through ongoing participatory dialogue
and self-criticism.  Thus, in an important sense, they are intentionally
unsettled.  The movement scholar Joshua Gamson has therefore
raised the provocative question, “Must identity movements self-de-
struct?”  He wrote that “[s]exuality-based politics . . . contains a
more general predicament of identity politics, whose workings and
implications are not well understood: it is as liberating and sensible
to demolish a collective identity as it is to establish one.”37
Identity groups have tended to remain isolated rather than to
form powerful and lasting alliances.  Though they can sometimes
come together around particular goals, as in the case of the disabili-
ties movement and the ADA, they rarely stay united for long.  In
36. See id. at 53-81. See also Judith Abler Hellman, The Riddle of New Social Move-
ments: Who They Are and What They Do, in CAPITAL, POWER AND INEQUALITY IN LATIN
AMERICA 167 (Sandor Halebsky & Richard L. Harris eds., 1995); Johnston, supra note
30; Offe, supra note 30.
37. Joshua Gamson, Must Identity Movements Self-Destruct? A Queer Dilemma, 42 SOC.
PROBS. 390, 402 (1995).
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many instances, cross-cutting identities led to intensely emotional
fissures: in the disabilities case, for instance, gender divisions have
led some women to complain of feeling like “aliens within [their]
own community.”38  These divisions undermine efforts to build last-
ing relationships and organizations: the general stress on self-explo-
ration and participatory democracy trumps the feeling of need for
discipline and unity.
Unions have often tried to connect to new movements, going
back at least to the massive “Solidarity Day” demonstration early in
the Reagan era,39 and developing recently through the union-
backed community organization Jobs with Justice,40 the 1999 Seat-
tle demonstrations against the World Trade Organization, and
other coalitional efforts.  Few of these relationships have lasted, and
they have certainly not developed into a broad sense of unity
among these groups who would seem to be natural allies.  There is
persistent tension and misunderstanding between “new movement”
groups that favor flexible, decentralized, local, participatory struc-
tures, and labor organizations that favor disciplined mass action.
Thus, on their own, the new movements have been unable to create
a broader network of coordination, and organized labor has not
managed to transform this latent energy into a concentrated force.
V. TAKING STOCK: CURRENT ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEMENTS
Over the past year I have tried to map the broad landscape of
organizations and movements with an impact on workplace jus-
tice.41  The union sphere has, of course, been well-studied by many
38. See Sarah Triano, Movement Building, http://www.disabledandproud.com/
movement.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2006).
39. “Solidarity Day,” organized by the AFL-CIO, brought together many commu-
nity, women’s minority, and other social-action groups for a march on Washington in
September 1981.
40. Jobs with Justice describes itself as “a network of local coalitions that connect
labor, faith-based, community, and student organizations to work together on work-
place and community social justice campaigns.” See Jobs with Justice, About JwJ, http://
www.jwj.org/AboutJWJ/AboutJWJ.htm (last visited June 21, 2005).
41. The last similar attempt to do this that I know of is Françoise Carré and
Pamela Joshi, Looking for Leverage in a Fluid World: Innovative Responses to Temporary and
Contracted Work, in NONSTANDARD WORK: THE NATURE AND CHALLENGE OF CHANGING
EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS 313 (Françoise Carre et al. eds., 2000).  There are many
other “maps” of particular segments of the field.
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scholars and activists, and so has the arena of immigrant worker
centers and Living Wage Campaigns.42  Using published sources,
web sites, and personal contacts, Jennifer Winkelman and I gath-
ered as much information as we could on other kinds of organiza-
tion, ranging from employee groups within corporations,
underground associations, community campaigns, coalitions of
contingent workers, and whatever else we could think of.  We were
also able to compare some results with my own similar research car-
ried out four to five years earlier, and with that of other researchers,
to give some sense of the developmental path.  In the end, we con-
ducted interviews with representatives of nine diverse organizations,
asking about their major accomplishments and challenges, their
trajectory of development, their governance structure, financing,
strategic goals, and main learnings.43
This research appears late in this article and is given very little
space because the findings were largely negative: that is, little clear
evidence was found that any new organization has built significant
momentum beyond a local level, or has shown a capacity to trans-
form employment relations on a large scale.  To be sure, many of
the efforts are extremely valuable to their members, many generate
great commitment and enthusiasm, and some are conceptually in-
novative and could possibly have great potential for the future.  The
Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership, for one, has saved over
1700 jobs through cooperative problem-solving among community
groups, unions, and companies.  Working Today has established a
successful portable health care package for contingent workers, has
achieved financial self-sufficiency, and has grown steadily.44  But de-
spite these and many other successes, these groups remain, from
42. On immigrant worker centers, see JANICE FINE & JON WERBERG, WORKER CEN-
TERS (2003). On Living Wage Campaigns, see Special Issue: The Impacts of Living Wage
Policies, 44 INDUS. REL. 1 (2005).
43. The organizations we interviewed were: WashTech, Working Partnerships,
The Workplace Project, Working Today, New Labor, The Wisconsin Regional Training
Partnership, the North American Alliance for Fair Employment (NAFFE), the Seattle
Jobs Initiative, and the Boston Private Industry Council.  For more information on the
Workplace Project, see Emily Stein, Organization Profile, The Workplace Project, 50 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 607 (2005-2006).
44. For more information on Working Today, see Sarah N. Kelly & Christine
Tramontano, Organization Profile, Working Today, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 597 (2005-
2006).
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the perspective of this article, very limited: none has developed the
power to transform labor markets or to challenge large corpora-
tions on vital issues.  Furthermore, many groups that seemed to
have momentum and energy a few years ago have disappeared or
have been transformed into mainstream fee-for-service career devel-
opment providers.
Essentially, the problems discussed above continue to dog
every variant of employee organization.  On the one hand, those
that try to generate mass action have sometimes generated bursts of
protest, but have not sustained a militant base that would provide
energy to the organization.  On the other hand, those that have
based themselves on identity movements have remained localized
and isolated.  One example from the wide spectrum is the immi-
grant worker centers: despite their proliferation (Janice Fine
counted 123 at last report).  They have remained anchored in par-
ticular ethnic groups and have rarely linked up with other races,
classes, or types of organization.45  Another is the set of living wage
campaigns: they have had some notable successes, but their actual
impact has been very modest — affecting small numbers of workers
— and rather than accelerating and building towards more ambi-
tious campaigns, their trajectory appears to be flattening.46
This is of course a broad assessment of an extremely fluid and
ill-defined field.  Yet, the empirical evidence on worker organiza-
tion does seem to fit the general pattern described: a failure to
build powerful unified organization that could challenge employ-
ers, and difficulty in linking to stable sources of solidarity and com-
mitment to ground such organizations.
VI. THE POTENTIAL POWER OF NETWORKS
So far this article has argued that existing unions are not well
structured to take advantage of the weaknesses in employer organi-
45. For example: Chinese Worker Organizing Center; Filipino Workers Center;
Black Workers for Justice; Korean Immigrant Workers Advocates; Latino Workers
Center. See Janice Fine et al., Worker Centers – Community-Based and Led Worker
Organizing Projects (2005), available at http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/catalog/
fine-map_imdens.pdf.
46. See Richard Freeman, Fighting for Other Folks’ Wages: The Logic and Illogic of Liv-
ing Wage Campaigns, 44 INDUS. REL. 14 (2005); David Fairris & Michael Reich, The Im-
pacts of Living Wage Policies: Introduction to the Special Issue, 44 INDUS. REL. 1 (2005).
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zations or to mobilize new movements.  To try to move beyond that
pessimistic conclusion, a third strand of theory that has been devel-
oping rapidly in recent years should be considered: the theory of
networks.47
This is, in a sense, a variant on organizational theory; but net-
works are not organizations in the familiar sense.  They do not have
stable hierarchies, reliable lines of accountability, balance sheets, or
even clearly identifiable memberships: they are fluid, open, and
generally voluntary.48  If the description stopped there, they cer-
tainly would not have the ability to affect industrial orders.  Max
Weber, the great theorist of bureaucracy, pointed out over a cen-
tury ago that bureaucracies can destroy all such loose associational
structures,49 and over the intervening period he has consistently
been proved right.
But there is a new element: proponents of network theory have
begun to see that there is a lot more to the story, and that certain
types of networks, with certain rules and standards of operations,
can be very effective in dealing with large, complex problems of
coordination.50  In other words, networks are not just structured
loosely, as people thought for many years; they are structured differ-
ently.  When those new principles of structure are grasped and prop-
erly used, networks can be effective agents of social change.
An influential 2001 study by the RAND Corp. coined the term
“netwar” to describe conflicts waged through this decentralized ap-
47. See generally Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. OF SOC.
1360 (1997); Jerald Hage & Catherine Alter, A Typology of Interorganizational Relationships
and Networks, in CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM: THE EMBEDDEDNESS OF INSTITUTIONS 94 (J.
Rogers Hollingsworth & Robert Boyer eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997); RONALD S.
BURT, STRUCTURAL HOLES: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF COMPETITION (1992); Candace
Jones et al., A General Theory of Network Governance: Exchange Conditions and Social Mecha-
nisms, 22 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 911 (1997); NETWORKS AND ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURE,
FORM AND ACTION (Nitin Nohria & Robert G. Eccles eds., 1997).
48. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.Net: Toward a Critical
Theory of Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749 (2003); SOCIAL STRUCTURES: A NETWORK AP-
PROACH (Barry Wellman & S.D. Berkowitz eds., 1988); SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND NETWORK
ANALYSIS (Peter V. Marsden & Nan Lin eds., 1982).
49. FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 228 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills
trans. & eds., 1946).
50. See sources cited supra note 47.
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proach.51  Of course the basic principles are nothing new: guerrilla
warfare has a long history and is highly developed in theory and
practice; it has shown itself capable of defeating large armies with
overwhelming conventional force, as the United States learned in
Vietnam.  The term “netwar” puts the spotlight on the added power
brought by the use of Internet technology, which makes it much
easier to coordinate decentralized operations.  The RAND study ex-
amined not only criminal and terrorist networks, but also cases of
effective social movements, such as the Zapatista rebellion in Mex-
ico and the protests against the World Trade Organization.
Netwar is particularly effective in situations in which the battle
is over information and the framing of issues.  This is increasingly
characteristic of advanced capitalist economies.  Though corpora-
tions have grown less vulnerable to mass strikes, they are more vul-
nerable to bad publicity and attacks on their reputations; they are
less self-sufficient than the dominant vertically-integrated firms of
the last century, and thus they need good will from many partners
to succeed.  Well-conducted informational net attacks are difficult
for corporations to parry.52
Networks should also be effective in dealing with the type of
organizational system described earlier as evolving in the manage-
ment sphere.  Employers are not only becoming gradually more de-
centralized and specialized, but also more tightly interdependent
and tied into webs of suppliers and alliances.53  The vulnerabilities
in these interdependent webs are better spotted and exploited by
short, rapid, targeted actions than by large, predictable mass
mobilizations.
Finally, the netwar approach has the great advantage of fitting
the underlying structure of “new movements.”  The characteristic
tactic of netwar is not the mass action, but — to use the RAND
study’s term — the “swarm.”  In a military context, RAND contrasts
51. See RAND CORP., NETWORKS AND NETWARS: THE FUTURE OF TERROR, CRIME,
AND MILITANCY (John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt eds., 2001) [hereinafter NETWORKS AND
NETWARS], available at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1382/.
52. This is most often shown by “corporate campaigns” waged by unions using
techniques of targeted publicity, see Edwin L. Brown & Tracy FH Chang, PACE Interna-
tional Union vs. Imerys Groupe: An Organizing Campaign Case Study, 29 LAB. STUD. J. 21
(2004). See generally JAROL B. MANHEIM, THE DEATH OF A THOUSAND CUTS: CORPORATE
CAMPAIGNS AND THE ATTACK ON THE CORPORATION (2000).
53. See sources cited supra note 19.
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it with the two tactics that have been dominant over the last two
centuries: “brute-force massing” and “nimble maneuver”:
Swarming is seemingly amorphous, but it is a deliberately
structured, coordinated, strategic way to strike from all di-
rections, by means of a sustainable pulsing of force and/
or fire, close-in as well as from stand-off positions.  It will
work best — perhaps it will only work — if it is designed
mainly around the deployment of myriad, small, dis-
persed, networked maneuver units . . .54
In the context of social change, they cite the Zapatista struggle:
. . . an alarmed mass of Mexican and transnational NGO
activists mobilized and descended on Chiapas and Mexico
City in ‘swarm networks.’ . . . the NGOs’ ability to swarm
into Mexico in response to the EZLN’s insurrection . . .
stemmed from a confluence of network-building efforts
spread over a decade or two at global, regional, and local
levels.55
And they note that “swarming best occurs where dispersed NGOs
are internetted and collaborate in ways that exhibit ‘collective diver-
sity’ and ‘coordinated anarchy.’”56
The swarm, in short, is a tactic that can make use of the kind of
action and solidarity characteristic of new movements: fluid, decen-
tralized, diverse, deliberately anarchic, and self-critical.  It does not
depend on strong hierarchical structures, or even on alliances
among stable organizations.  Unions, like armies, have relied prima-
rily on “brute-force massing” and, to a lesser extent, on “nimble
maneuver”; for unions, like armies, the time may have come to shift
tactical focus.
But if the swarm is a useful tactic, there remains the problem
of organizing it — that is, building it into a force that can fight a
sustained battle towards consistent goals.  The problem with swarms
54.  RAND CORP., JOHN ARQUILLA & DAVID RONFELDT, SWARMING AND THE FUTURE
OF CONFLICT VII (2000), available at http://www.rand.org/publications/DB/DB311/
DB311.pdf.
55. NETWORKS AND NETWARS, supra note 51.
56. Id. at 193.
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is that they tend to disperse rapidly.57  This has been the historical
problem with all forms of anarchist or associational action: a well-
organized opponent can simply outwait them.
There have been important recent developments in under-
standing on this front as well: in some arenas, patterns of network
action have been sustained and coordinated well enough to take on
the most powerful corporations.  These developments are perhaps
most visible in the open-source software movement.  This non-com-
mercial, voluntary approach has succeeded in large-scale projects
that require intense coordination and focus, such as the develop-
ment of a browser (Mozilla) and an operating system (Linux) capa-
ble of challenging Microsoft head to head.58
There are many “secrets” to the successful operation of such a
task-focused network — tricks, procedures, and techniques that
have to be learned over time through trial and error, and that are
far from being fully understood and codified.  The overall keys,
however, seem to be first, a consistent code that governs all interac-
tions — a shared language, as it were, or a set of professional stan-
dards; second, an effective system for building and testing
reputations, so that those who contribute most to the effort gain in
influence and those who do not are marginalized; and third, an
overall goal or vision that motivates sufficient numbers of
participants.59
Each of these points poses serious organizational challenges.
The range of social-justice organizations is currently highly frag-
57. This is true essentially by definition: a swarm is a quick action.  If it is sustained
it turns into a collaborative network.  The dynamic can be supported by case evidence
such as the attempts to sustain campaigns as discussed in Bruce Nissen, The Effectiveness
and Limits of Labor-Community Coalitions: Evidence from South Florida, 29 LAB. STUD. J. 67
(2004).
58. See Eric Steven Raymond, The Cathedral and the Bazaar (Aug. 2, 2002), http:/
/www.catb.org/~esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/cathedral-bazaar/; Yochai Benkler,
Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002).
59. For an important exploration of the dynamics of open-source software devel-
opment, see Raymond, supra note 58. See also JOHN H. HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER: HOW
ADAPTATION BUILDS COMPLEXITY 161-72 (1995) (discussing the “self-organizing systems”
strand of network theory); 1 JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE AC-
TION, REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY (1984) (discussing the communica-
tions theory strand of network theory); 2 JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM: A CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON
(1984); Froomkin, supra note 48 (analyzing Habermas’s communications theory).
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mented and far from having either a common vision or a common
language.  Also lacking is the kind of coherent reputational system
that holds together eBay, Inc., or underlies cooperation in open-
source projects.
But there is no fundamental reason why these challenges are
insurmountable, and there is some evidence that groups are learn-
ing how to do it.  The campaign against Wal-Mart is a promising
current example of sustained informational netwar.  A large num-
ber of associational movements — community groups, women’s
groups, and others — have combined with unions in a continuous
attack on the company’s policies from many angles — a prototypi-
cal “swarm.”  For a long time, management was determined to ig-
nore the attacks.  But in early 2005 they were forced to recognize
that the campaign was doing real damage to their consumer rela-
tions and to their ability to expand into new communities.  In re-
sponse, they launched an advertising campaign to try to improve
public perceptions.60  It is particularly interesting, though, that on
this terrain the company was not in a position of strength: fighting
the netwar tactics put it on the defensive.  Wal-Mart’s senior vice
president for corporate affairs, speaking of the advertising cam-
paign, said, “There is a downside, because we are giving attention
and even a platform to our critics, . . . [but] [w]e don’t have a
choice.”61  A crisis communications adviser added that the com-
pany’s response “is all about picking the best of your bad options
. . .  it’s not about winning.”62
In general, corporate campaigns represent an initial step by
some unions in the direction of mobilizing networks in netwars,
and they have had some success.63  But they are still a long way from
the notion of a fully mobilized campaign: using the power of the
Internet to bring together widely diverse groups in concentrated
swarms.  There is a long road of learning and development of capa-
bilities between here and there.
60. See Nat Ives, Wal-Mart and Eli Lilly Turn to Full-Page Ads to Address Their Critics,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2005, at C5.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See MANHEIM, supra note 52. R
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VII. CONCLUSION
History has left us with a dominant image of labor as an effec-
tive social force combining mass mobilization and concentrated or-
ganization.  This familiar way of acting, however, has lost its
effectiveness, because both the business and social contexts have
changed.  The alternative vision is radically different: networks en-
gaged in netwars.  Networks have advantages on two fronts: in con-
fronting modern flexible and decentralized management systems,
and in mobilizing the energy of new movements.64
In the past, corporations were able to crush networks.  But the
changing context has given networks a new life.  They are poten-
tially stronger than before because of a growing understanding of
how they work best and because of technological advances that
speed decentralized communication.  While formal hierarchies —
bureaucracies — are weaker than before because they do not ap-
peal to most workers and because they are not responsive enough
for a knowledge-based economy.
The type of organization and leadership needed to build and
sustain networks and netwars is in many ways the opposite of that
needed for traditional mass action and large-scale hierarchies —
that is, the opposite of the way the NUP framed the issue.  The NUP
approach is familiar: if you’re getting beat, you need to bulk up.
The network approach, by contrast, is still highly counterintuitive.
It requires that labor think of itself as a coordinator rather than a
power, as a player in a complex force field rather than as the leader
of the forces of social justice.  It is in many ways an attitude of
humility, but it could very well be now that in humility there is
strength.
From this perspective, the main problem for labor is not to
grow in size by adding members; indeed, in the world of new move-
ments and netwars, it is not always clear who is a member and who
is not.  The key question is not how many members you have, but
who you can mobilize.  A small number at the right time can have
64. In this short paper I have emphasized only a few parts of the picture.  In par-
ticular I have concentrated on the capability of networks to sustain pressure and con-
flict. They are also relatively good, however, at other sides of social action, such as
influencing legislatures, generating public support, and providing services to members.
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more effect than a large mass, and they need not be “members” in
the sense of “signing up” for a permanent organization.
The real problem for labor is to grow in influence — in the
ability to unite groups outside its own boundaries.  With influence,
labor could help bring together different and shifting communities
around key campaigns.  With influence, it could concentrate its ef-
forts on the weak points of the relations among firms.  Influence
comes from vision and from the ability to listen without dominat-
ing.  It comes from understanding how networks work — the logic
of swarms and identities and campaigns — and being able to reflect
the values of a large range of social justice groups.  The pursuit of
influence would put energy and resources into meetings with far-
flung groups, building alliances, structuring consistent communica-
tions systems across diverse organizations, and Internet capability.
It is a way of acting that is as different from industrial union organi-
zation as industrial unions were different from crafts in the 1930s,
and as continuous as both with the core mission of labor.
